INTELLIGENCE

THE RECORD

REFERENCE

DexProof recorded CAPITOL as CAUTION on Robinhood Chain under formula v2.0.1, in verdict #1265 published 27 Oct 2026 (UTC). Of 28 checks, 16 passed, 2 warned, 3 failed and 7 could not be run.

CA
CAPITOLCapitol markets
0x7e37…268c
RobinhoodScanned 3d agoRescanLedgerTrade
CautionNº 1265 · 3d agoDexProof verdict

Trade with care. Read the warnings first.

The largest liquidity provider, (a contract), holds 100.0% of this pool's liquidity.

Scanned 3d ago. Scan again before you trade.

  • FAILLP custody
  • FAILSerial clone
  • FAILLaunchpad provenance
✓ 16! 2✕ 3? 7 not checked

Price

—

Liquidity

—

Volume 24h

—

FDV

—

Buys 24h

—

Age

—

Red flags

  • LP custody

    Fail

    The largest liquidity provider, (a contract), holds 100.0% of this pool's liquidity.

    It is not the deployer. This contract is not a trusted locker, so this liquidity is not considered locked. The liquidity sits in a locker whose owner can take it back. Our review of this locker found a recovery function that only its owner can call. None of this V3 pool's liquidity is burned or locked. This pool is on Uniswap V3 and holds 100.0% of the liquidity we could read. 2 other pools charge a fee too large to trade through, so nothing a holder owns is at risk there.

    • pool
    • dexIduniswap
    • feeTier100
    • deployer
    • protocoluniswap-v3
    • lockTerms7 fields
      • whyno-adapter
      • lockIdnull
      • statusunreadable
      • adapternull
      • isEternalfalse
      • lockOwnernull
      • unlockDatenull
    • coverageOktrue
    • mintEvents1
    • stateBlock99258923
    • whaleAudit5 fields
      • whyknown-untrusted-locker
      • subject
      • verdictINCONCLUSIVE
      • attemptedfalse
      • untrustedLocker2 fields
        • labelLockToken_musebook_Unsafe
        • whyNotTrustedERC1967 upgradeable proxy; implementation exposes recoverAssets callable by owner
    • currentTick185168
    • deployerPct0
    • lockerTermsnone
    • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
    • demotedPools2 items
      • #14 fields
        • lpFee900000
        • poolId
        • reasonuntradeable-fee
        • statusFAIL
      • #24 fields
        • lpFee900000
        • poolId
        • reasonuntradeable-fee
        • statusFAIL
    • deployerKindEOA
    • protectedPct0
    • attributedPct1
    • burnAddressesnone
    • deployerKnowntrue
    • largestPuller5 fields
      • kindCONTRACT
      • address
      • liquidity31622807953636212567716
      • pctOfPool1
      • isDeployerfalse
    • npmRangesRead1
    • poolsAssessed3 items
      • #119 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • reasonThe largest liquidity provider, 0x3a7de5f29557405f5d9fd06b570a53b966a78e8e (a contract), holds 100.0% of this pool's liquidity. It is not the deployer. This contract is not a trusted locker, so this liquidity is not considered locked. The liquidity sits in a locker whose owner can take it back. Our review of this locker found a recovery function that only its owner can call. None of this V3 pool's liquidity is burned or locked.
        • scoredtrue
        • statusFAIL
        • feeTier100
        • protocoluniswap-v3
        • lockTerms7 fields
          • whyno-adapter
          • lockIdnull
          • statusunreadable
          • adapternull
          • isEternalfalse
          • lockOwnernull
          • unlockDatenull
        • coverageOktrue
        • stateBlock99258923
        • whaleAudit5 fields
          • whyknown-untrusted-locker
          • subject
          • verdictINCONCLUSIVE
          • attemptedfalse
          • untrustedLocker2 fields
            • labelLockToken_musebook_Unsafe
            • whyNotTrustedERC1967 upgradeable proxy; implementation exposes recoverAssets callable by owner
        • deployerPct0
        • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
        • protectedPct0
        • attributedPct1
        • largestPuller5 fields
          • kindCONTRACT
          • address
          • liquidity31622807953636212567716
          • pctOfPool1
          • isDeployerfalse
        • holderListReadtrue
        • mintIndexCompletetrue
        • poolShareOfLiquidity1
      • #221 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee900000
        • poolId
        • reasonThe largest liquidity provider, 0x293871d953e9efd6208852bcf6d6af5bdd209401 (a plain wallet), controls 100.0% of this pool's liquidity and can withdraw it at any moment. It is not the deployer. Renouncing ownership does not protect against this. None of this V4 pool's liquidity is burned or locked.
        • scoredtrue
        • statusFAIL
        • feeTier900000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • coverageOktrue
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • deployerPct0
        • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
        • protectedPct0
        • attributedPct1
        • largestPuller5 fields
          • kindEOA
          • address
          • liquidity4236869414663
          • pctOfPool1
          • isDeployerfalse
        • holderListReadtrue
        • reconciledAgainststate-at-ceiling
        • reconciledAtBlock99258923
        • eventIndexCompletetrue
        • poolShareOfLiquiditynull
      • #321 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee900000
        • poolId
        • reasonThe largest liquidity provider, 0x293871d953e9efd6208852bcf6d6af5bdd209401 (a plain wallet), controls 100.0% of this pool's liquidity and can withdraw it at any moment. It is not the deployer. Renouncing ownership does not protect against this. None of this V4 pool's liquidity is burned or locked.
        • scoredtrue
        • statusFAIL
        • feeTier900000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • coverageOktrue
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • deployerPct0
        • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
        • protectedPct0
        • attributedPct1
        • largestPuller5 fields
          • kindEOA
          • address
          • liquidity51692148830240775
          • pctOfPool1
          • isDeployerfalse
        • holderListReadtrue
        • reconciledAgainststate-at-ceiling
        • reconciledAtBlock99258923
        • eventIndexCompletetrue
        • poolShareOfLiquiditynull
    • rangeCoverage1
    • holderListReadtrue
    • lockersMatchednone
    • mintTxsScanned1
    • positionsFound1
    • trustedLockers21 items
      • #1
      • #2
      • #3
      • #4
      • #5
      • #6
      • #7
      • #8
      • #9
      • #10
      • #11
      • #12
      • #13
      • #14
      • #15
      • #16
      • #17
      • #18
      • #19
      • #20
      • #21
    • activeLiquidity31622807953636212567716
    • poolMaterialPct0.05
    • positionManager
    • inactivePositions0
    • mintIndexCompletetrue
    • effectiveThresholds4 fields
      • coverageMinPct0.9
      • pullerMaterialPct0.05
      • deployerMaterialPct0.05
      • protectedHeadlinePct0.9
    • materialityMeasuredtrue
    • unresolvedPositions0
    • v4DiscoveryCompletetrue
    • lookedThroughPositions0
  • Serial clone

    Fail

    This exact code was used by 13 other tokens, and 13 of them lost most of their value or had their liquidity removed.

    They include 0x324d…3545, 0x39aa…5598, 0x9465…d56a. That describes those tokens, and it does not say who created this one.

    • labelnull
    • cohort3 fields
      • escalatedtrue
      • matchedTokens13
      • incidentTokens13
    • seenCount14
    • truncatedfalse
    • walletLink8 fields
      • sourcetokens.deployer
      • statusunverified
      • verifiedReasonDistinct deployer addresses on record; no direct creator link verified.
      • currentDeployer
      • matchedDeployer
      • sameRecordedDeployerfalse
      • isInfrastructureSubjectfalse
      • linkedIncidentTokenAddressnull
    • bytecodeHash
    • completenesscomplete
    • classificationunknown
    • stainedLineagefalse
    • matchedIncidents13 items
      • #18 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 15:45:42.669+00
        • referenceId769
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #28 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 23:12:16.716+00
        • referenceId804
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #38 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 08:49:45.618+00
        • referenceId731
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #48 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-26 16:30:08.998+00
        • referenceId1172
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #58 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 23:20:33.828+00
        • referenceId807
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #68 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 09:01:11.112+00
        • referenceId736
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #78 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-16 22:00:18.360341+00
        • referenceId76
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #88 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-16 15:00:11.761243+00
        • referenceId75
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #98 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-16 00:00:12.338457+00
        • referenceId73
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #108 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 06:00:08.706495+00
        • referenceId68
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #118 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-14 19:00:09.746841+00
        • referenceId66
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #128 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-13 19:00:09.09517+00
        • referenceId62
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #138 fields
        • details1 field
          • markKindpump_dump
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-12 01:00:08.496791+00
        • referenceId53
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeactive_pump_dump_mark
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
    • matchedTokensCount13
  • Launchpad provenance

    Fail

    Launched on an unregistered launchpad, but we don't know how that launchpad works, so we can't say whether there was a raise for the creator to buy into.

    96.2% of the token supply was bought for 25.5000 ETH by 6 wallets in the transaction that opened its pool, before outside buyers could trade.

    • launchpadnull
    • raisedEth0
    • raisedRaw0
    • raiseStaletrue
    • venueModelnull
    • curveStatusGRADUATED
    • progressBpsnull
    • raiseReadAtnull
    • raisedQuote0
    • creatorBuyEthnull
    • quoteDecimals18
    • dexPoolAddress
    • creatorBuyQuotenull
    • launchInsiderBuy11 fields
      • ethIn25500000000000000000
      • pools
      • statusinsider-buy
      • txHash
      • creatornull
      • factorynull
      • fundedBy
      • tokensOut962260447400039078289055125
      • recipients6 items
        • #12 fields
          • address
          • tokensOut333310669747271406081941373
        • #22 fields
          • address
          • tokensOut342029920875741152785285202
        • #32 fields
          • address
          • tokensOut169434930301848594471459678
        • #42 fields
          • address
          • tokensOut74039887365210094319922705
        • #52 fields
          • address
          • tokensOut28968382570535250127749300
        • #62 fields
          • address
          • tokensOut14476656539432580502696867
      • supplyBoughtPct96.226
      • singleSidedSeeds1 item
        • #15 fields
          • pool
          • tickLower-887272
          • tickUpper207243
          • ethDeposited0
          • tokensDeposited999999999999999999999981671
    • venueModelUnknowntrue
    • creatorShareOfRaisenull
  • Prior pump-and-dump mark

    Warn

    This token crashed after launch.

    On 2026-10-13, its price or liquidity fell 95% or more below its 72-hour peak, and a second data source confirmed it. This often happens when early buyers sell. On its own it does not mean the contract or its liquidity is unsafe.

    • labelcrashed_after_launch
    • markedOn2026-10-13
    • marksReadtrue
    • firedCount1
    • sourceVerdictIdnull
  • Checks with missing data

    Warn

    We couldn't read some checks on this scan, so the verdict is limited.

    A failed read is not a clean result. This describes what we could see, not the token.

    • deferredfalse
    • capAppliedtrue
    • custodyCapAppliedfalse
    • unavailableChecks6 items
      • #11 field
        • idfunding_lineage
      • #21 field
        • idliquidity_depth
      • #31 field
        • idfdv_liquidity_ratio
      • #41 field
        • idvolume_turnover
      • #51 field
        • idwash_trading
      • #61 field
        • idpool_age
    • issuerCoveredUnreadnone

These are gaps in what we could see, not problems found in this token.

  • Deployer pulled liquidity

    Not checked

    We can't rule out that the creator pulled liquidity from this token's pool.

    We didn't check 158 transactions by the creator that could remove liquidity.

    • indexed7 fields
      • v2Pairs0
      • v3Pools1
      • v4Pools2
      • venuesUnreaddeployer-receipts:158-unchecked
      • windowBlocksfull-history
      • venuesCovereddeployer-history:0x2e2e031535ed6fe1adf2b77dc0048f06754ca4cc
      • lockerFeeRemovals0
    • deployer
    • poolCoverage8 fields
      • pools3
      • restPools2
      • restAmount405375104790305525516
      • v4Leftover877383457890428789899
      • materialPools1
      • measuredTotal331812678412950186757281056
      • poolManagerBalance1282758562680734315415
      • unmeasuredRestPools0
    • globalHistoryPullsnone
    • unclassifiedPositionManagerCallsnone
  • Funding lineage

    Not checked

    We found no active rug markers in the funding records we checked, but we couldn't trace every wallet linked to this deployer.

    • pathnone
    • funder
    • coveragestored-markers-only
    • deployer
    • subjectViacreator
    • completenessunknown
    • originDeployernull
  • Liquidity depth

    Not checked

    We could not read this token's market data, so we did not measure its pool depth.

    That is a gap in what we could see, not a finding about the token. The opening token deposit into pool contained no ETH. Its opening ETH came from buyers.

    • singleSidedLaunchSeeds1 item
      • #15 fields
        • pool
        • tickLower-887272
        • tickUpper207243
        • ethDeposited0
        • tokensDeposited999999999999999999999981671
  • FDV vs liquidity ratio

    Not checked

    We don't have the market data needed to compare this token's value at full supply with its liquidity.

    • Volume turnover

      Not checked

      We don't have the volume and liquidity figures needed to check turnover.

      • Wash trading

        Not checked

        We don't have the market data needed to check for wash trading.

        • Pool age

          Not checked

          We could not find when this token's pool was created.

          • Impersonation

            Pass

            This token does not share its name and symbol with any real tokenized share.

            • checkedAgainst197
          • Explorer scam flag

            Pass

            The explorer has not tagged this contract as a scam.

            • is_scamfalse
            • public_tagsnone
          • Honeypot

            Pass

            A test sale worked from two separate new wallets.

            A test buy worked too. We ran it at this chain's live gas price (40036000 wei).

            • deepPass10 fields
              • oktrue
              • sells2 items
                • #15 fields
                  • oktrue
                  • fee100
                  • detailsell succeeded at fee tier 100
                  • wallet
                  • amountOut90906270639
                • #25 fields
                  • oktrue
                  • fee100
                  • detailsell succeeded at fee tier 100
                  • wallet
                  • amountOut90906270639
              • detailSelling worked for independent new wallets.
              • balanceSlot0
              • gasPriceWei40036000
              • disagreementfalse
              • inconclusivefalse
              • allowanceSlot1
              • gasPriceSourcebaseFeeHeadroom
              • gasSensitivity1 field
                • statenot-sensitive
            • discovery5 fields
              • pools1 item
                • #12 fields
                  • fee100
                  • pool
              • completetrue
              • emptyPoolsnone
              • faultedTiersnone
              • tiersChecked100500300010000
            • quoterPass6 fields
              • oktrue
              • fee100
              • buyOut1096178975572494769592437
              • detailBuying 0.01 ETH of the token and selling it straight back returned 0.009932130022955375 ETH (99.3%), on the pool with a 0.01% fee.
              • poolFoundtrue
              • roundTripRatio0.9932130022955376
            • routeTable3 items
              • #17 fields
                • maintrue
                • pool
                • smallfalse
                • token
                • venueuniswap-v3
                • resultsold
                • depthUsd69.37165394540291
              • #27 fields
                • mainfalse
                • pool
                • smalltrue
                • token
                • venueuniswap-v4
                • resultcould-not-test
                • depthUsd0.0006389999999999999
              • #37 fields
                • mainfalse
                • pool
                • smalltrue
                • token
                • venueuniswap-v4
                • resultcould-not-test
                • depthUsd0.00047724153308802744
            • simWallets
            • adapterSell3 fields
              • coverage6 fields
                • completetrue
                • attempted2
                • materiality4 fields
                  • mainPool
                  • measuredtrue
                  • smallPools2
                  • mainDepthUsd69.37165394540291
                • omittedKeysnone
                • omittedPools0
                • candidateCount2
              • routeSimulations2 items
                • #14 fields
                  • reasonThe entry-matched round trip recovers only 0.1% of the counter-token input. That is too little value to demonstrate an exit, whether from fees, a tax, or thin liquidity.
                  • statusINCONCLUSIVE
                  • evidence22 fields
                    • buy2 fields
                      • kindOUT
                      • amountOut106668611257719531008
                    • pool
                    • sell2 fields
                      • kindOUT
                      • amountOut1584841957332
                    • faultfalse
                    • hooks
                    • poolId
                    • revertfalse
                    • counter
                    • feeTier900000
                    • routeId
                    • hooklesstrue
                    • protocoluniswap-v4
                    • tradeablelive
                    • hookCodeHashnull
                    • hookMaliciousfalse
                    • hookCodeStatusnot_applicable
                    • activeLiquidity51692148830240775
                    • hookPermissions5 fields
                      • afterSwapfalse
                      • beforeSwapfalse
                      • swapAffectingfalse
                      • afterSwapReturnsDeltafalse
                      • beforeSwapReturnsDeltafalse
                    • hookSwapAffectingfalse
                    • roundTripTokenInput106668611257719531008
                    • hookMatchedSelectorsnone
                    • roundTripCounterInput1000000000000000
                  • setAsidetrue
                • #24 fields
                  • reasonThe entry-matched round trip recovers only 0.9% of the counter-token input. That is too little value to demonstrate an exit, whether from fees, a tax, or thin liquidity.
                  • statusINCONCLUSIVE
                  • evidence22 fields
                    • buy2 fields
                      • kindOUT
                      • amountOut421167883005097537
                    • pool
                    • sell2 fields
                      • kindOUT
                      • amountOut9
                    • faultfalse
                    • hooks
                    • poolId
                    • revertfalse
                    • counter
                    • feeTier900000
                    • routeId
                    • hooklesstrue
                    • protocoluniswap-v4
                    • tradeablelive
                    • hookCodeHashnull
                    • hookMaliciousfalse
                    • hookCodeStatusnot_applicable
                    • activeLiquidity4236869414663
                    • hookPermissions5 fields
                      • afterSwapfalse
                      • beforeSwapfalse
                      • swapAffectingfalse
                      • afterSwapReturnsDeltafalse
                      • beforeSwapReturnsDeltafalse
                    • hookSwapAffectingfalse
                    • roundTripTokenInput421167883005097537
                    • hookMatchedSelectorsnone
                    • roundTripCounterInput1000
                  • setAsidetrue
              • alternativeRoutes1 item
                • #18 fields
                  • pool
                  • poolId
                  • reasonThe entry-matched round trip recovers only 0.9% of the counter-token input. That is too little value to demonstrate an exit, whether from fees, a tax, or thin liquidity.
                  • statusINCONCLUSIVE
                  • feeTier900000
                  • routeId
                  • protocoluniswap-v4
                  • clearOrInconclusiveReasonThe entry-matched round trip recovers only 0.9% of the counter-token input. That is too little value to demonstrate an exit, whether from fees, a tax, or thin liquidity.
            • tokenWideRule2 fields
              • firedfalse
              • failedii
            • buySellAsymmetry3 fields
              • buys24hnull
              • flaggedfalse
              • sells24hnull
            • routeMateriality5 fields
              • mainPool
              • setAside2
              • mainDepthUsd69.37165394540291
              • setAsidePools
              • untestedSmall0
          • Funder rug history

            Pass

            Nothing on record ties , the wallet that funded the creator, to a past rug on Robinhood Chain.

            • funder
            • deployer
            • subjectViacreator
            • funderFanOut2
            • funderRecord2 fields
              • launchesDead0
              • confirmedRugs0
          • Confirmed rug

            Pass

            This token is not on our list of confirmed rugs.

            • tokenRugReadtrue
          • Prior honeypot mark

            Pass

            This token has no honeypot mark in our records.

            • marksReadtrue
          • Deployer launch history

            Pass

            This deployer has no earlier launches on record.

            • deployer
            • subjectViacreator
            • deadLaunches0
            • priorLaunches0
            • priorConfirmedRugs0
          • Holder concentration

            Pass

            Top 10 holders hold 9% of the tokens in circulation.

            Against total supply, the top 10 hold 6.2%. Liquidity pools hold 33.2% of total supply, and we leave them out of the tokens in circulation. The top 10 share also moves when pool liquidity moves, even if no holder trades.

            • basiscirculating float (total supply − liquidity pools − burn)
            • top1010 items
              • #13 fields
                • classEOA
                • value57481262565360641677443677
                • address
              • #23 fields
                • classEOA
                • value468280194986978190851782
                • address
              • #33 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467984544291552981506529
                • address
              • #43 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467968335079915990034755
                • address
              • #53 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467826249761379445218780
                • address
              • #63 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467791603108545493435791
                • address
              • #73 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467585479735650276435103
                • address
              • #83 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467474598594491041910785
                • address
              • #93 fields
                • classEOA
                • value467335314390631262005021
                • address
              • #103 fields
                • classEOA
                • value466615108057115188366431
                • address
            • excludedpoolsregistered custody / DEX infrastructurelaunchpad curve escrowpermanent supply lockersdead addresses
            • top10Pct9.23
            • holderCount50
            • totalSupply1000000000000000000000000000
            • holderListReadtrue
            • top10PctMerged9.23
            • excludedBalance331812273037845396451755540
            • poolSetCompletetrue
            • wallet7702Count0
            • circulatingFloat668187726962154603548244460
            • holderClassBasiseth_getCode per holder: EOA / WALLET_7702 (EIP-7702 delegation designator, a user wallet) / CONTRACT / UNREADABLE (getCode faulted). All classes count toward the share; the prose names each holder by its own class.
            • escrowLookThroughnull
            • excludedPoolCount11
            • pooledPctOfSupply33.18
            • curveEscrowAddressnull
            • curveEscrowExcluded0
            • lockedSupplyExcluded0
            • top10PctOfTotalSupply6.16
            • curveEscrowPctOfSupply0
            • poolAndBurnPctOfSupply33.18
            • lockedSupplyPctOfSupply0
            • top10PctBeforeLookThrough9.23
            • balancesExceedReportedSupplyfalse
          • Contract ownership

            Pass

            The contract has no owner function, so it has no single owner wallet.

            • ownerFunctionfalse
            • contractAuditAuthorities1 item
              • #13 fields
                • kindunknown
                • controllernull
                • materialityNoteGeneral contract authority (no capability findings supplied).
            • contractAuditCapabilitiesnone
            • contractAuditCompletenesscomplete
            • contractAuditSourceVerifiedtrue
          • Upgradeable proxy

            Pass

            This contract's code is fixed.

            We found no standard upgrade setup on it.

            • proxyfalse
            • contractAuditProxyGraph8 fields
              • kindnone
              • adminnull
              • depth0
              • beaconnull
              • facetsnull
              • completenesscomplete
              • implementationnull
              • truncationReasonnull
          • Source verification

            Pass

            This contract's source is verified on the explorer, but it was matched from another address with identical bytecode, not proven against this one.

            • answeredBy2 fields
              • sourceIdblockscout
              • servedFromfresh
            • is_verifiedtrue
            • via_bytecode_dbtrue
            • is_fully_verifiedtrue
            • is_partially_verifiedfalse
          • Dangerous functions

            Pass

            We found no privileged powers in the token contract's code.

            We looked at its audited source and compiled code.

            • auditDriventrue
            • capabilitiesnone
            • completenesscomplete
            • unaccountedSelectorsnone
            • dispatchAccountedFromabi
          • Tax manipulation

            Pass

            We saw no fee or limit changes by the deployer in the transactions we searched.

            We only looked at the deployer's recent history, so changes by a separate fee owner would not show.

            • scopedeployer-recent-history
            • searchedDeployerTxs50
          • Paid promotion

            Pass

            No paid promotion found on DexScreener.

            • paidOrdersnone
            • activeBoosts0
            • approvedOrderTypesnone
            • heavyCampaignThreshold50
          • Contract age

            Pass

            This contract was 14 days old at this scan.

            • ageHours344.2
            • creationTx
            • deployedAt2026-10-13T04:45:00.000000Z
          • Bytecode fingerprint

            Pass

            The source is verified, so anyone can read the code.

            We could not match it to a known template.

            • fingerprintUNKNOWN
            • bytecodeLength1923
          Holders
          Top 1 · 8.6%Next 9 · 0.6%Rest · 90.8%
          • Largest wallet8.6%
            0xb406…0977
          • #2 wallet0.1%
            0xfd2f…446d
          Key addresses
          • LARGEST HOLDER
            0xb406…0977
          • DEPLOYER
            0x2e2E…A4cc
          • FUNDING WALLET
            0xe941…808d
          Nº 1265 · CAUTION · formula v2.0.1 · Oct 27, 2026Verify on the ledger · Report a mistake
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