INTELLIGENCE

THE RECORD

REFERENCE

DexProof recorded 旺柴 as CRITICAL on Robinhood Chain under formula v1.63, in verdict #1249 published 27 Oct 2026 (UTC). Of 28 checks, 10 passed, 4 warned, 3 failed and 11 could not be run.

旺柴
旺柴WangChai
0x7795…0bce
RobinhoodScanned 3d agoRescanLedger
FlaggedNº 1249 · 3d agoDexProof verdict

Don't trade this token.

The wallet that sent this token's launch transaction removed liquidity from this token's pool.

Scanned 3d ago. Scan again before you trade.

  • FAILDeployer pulled liquidity
  • FAILDangerous functions
  • FAILSerial clone
✓ 10! 4✕ 3? 11 not checked
Evaluated under method 1.63. The current method is 2.0.1. See what changed

Price

—

Liquidity

—

Volume 24h

—

FDV

—

Buys 24h

—

Age

—

Red flags

  • Deployer pulled liquidity

    Fail

    The wallet that sent this token's launch transaction removed liquidity from this token's pool.

    That wallet is , and it made 1 withdrawal on Uniswap V4, and that withdrawal closed the position completely.

    • indexed7 fields
      • v2Pairs0
      • v3Pools0
      • v4Pools7
      • venuesUnreaddeployer-receipts:578-unchecked
      • windowBlocksfull-history
      • venuesCovereddeployer-history:0x2d89e2bcb27ce79708e0d094b3ea5388af86ce29
      • lockerFeeRemovals0
    • deployer
    • launchSender
    • poolCoverage8 fields
      • pools7
      • restPools2
      • restAmount80549540653470218826
      • v4Leftover35524551234331813289694
      • materialPools5
      • measuredTotal12614157999848303594969
      • poolManagerBalance48138709234180116884663
      • unmeasuredRestPools0
    • attributedPulls1 item
      • #110 fields
        • by
        • exitcomplete
        • pool
        • block98242182
        • methodModifyLiquidity
        • txHash
        • logIndex2
        • position4 fields
          • salt
          • owner
          • tickLower-887272
          • tickUpper887272
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • tokenAmount39495973472336127839022072
    • globalHistoryPullsnone
    • unclassifiedPositionManagerCallsnone
  • Dangerous functions

    Fail

    The token contract has privileged powers: address block, a switch that can block transfers or selling, upgrade code.

    Someone can still use them, or we couldn't tell who controls them.

    • reachabletrue
    • auditDriventrue
    • capabilities3 items
      • #14 fields
        • livenesslive
        • functionssetBlacklist(address,bool)setBlacklistBatch(address[],bool)
        • capabilityADDRESS_BLOCK
        • confidenceverified-semantic
      • #24 fields
        • livenesslive
        • functionsinitialize(string,string,uint256,address,address,string,string,Socials)setBlacklist(address,bool)setBlacklistBatch(address[],bool)
        • capabilityTRANSFER_GATE_LOCAL
        • confidenceverified-semantic
      • #34 fields
        • livenesslive
        • functionsupgradeToAndCall(address,bytes)
        • capabilityUPGRADE_CODE
        • confidenceselector-hint
    • completenesscomplete
  • Serial clone

    Fail

    This exact code was used by 6 other tokens, and 6 of them lost most of their value or had their liquidity removed.

    They include 0x0214…c9b3, 0x9759…5e81, 0xa3bb…5d1a. That describes those tokens, and it does not say who created this one.

    • labelnull
    • cohort3 fields
      • escalatedtrue
      • matchedTokens6
      • incidentTokens6
    • seenCount7
    • truncatedfalse
    • walletLink8 fields
      • sourcetokens.deployer
      • statusunverified
      • verifiedReasonDistinct deployer addresses on record; no direct creator link verified.
      • currentDeployer
      • matchedDeployer
      • sameRecordedDeployerfalse
      • isInfrastructureSubjectfalse
      • linkedIncidentTokenAddressnull
    • bytecodeHash
    • completenesscomplete
    • classificationunknown
    • stainedLineagefalse
    • matchedIncidents6 items
      • #18 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-22 09:45:58.64+00
        • referenceId1080
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #28 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-23 22:56:41.237+00
        • referenceId1132
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #38 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 15:02:20.449+00
        • referenceId764
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #48 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-21 03:46:30.212+00
        • referenceId1037
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #58 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-15 10:46:55.174+00
        • referenceId748
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
      • #68 fields
        • details1 field
          • checkdeployer_pulled_liquidity
        • tokenNamenull
        • recordedAt2026-10-20 11:23:17.925+00
        • referenceId1008
        • tokenSymbolnull
        • incidentTypeliquidity_removal_finding
        • tokenAddress
        • deployerAddress
    • matchedTokensCount6
  • Honeypot

    Warn

    We couldn't finish the sell test on the other exchanges we checked.

    We couldn't get a clear result from any pool we tested, so we can't say whether this token can be sold.

    • discovery5 fields
      • poolsnone
      • completetrue
      • emptyPoolsnone
      • faultedTiersnone
      • tiersChecked100500300010000
    • routeTable7 items
      • #17 fields
        • maintrue
        • pool
        • smallfalse
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultnot-tested
        • depthUsd0.06597499999999999
      • #27 fields
        • mainfalse
        • pool
        • smallfalse
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultnot-tested
        • depthUsd0.017724999999999998
      • #37 fields
        • mainfalse
        • pool
        • smallfalse
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultnot-tested
        • depthUsd0.013944
      • #47 fields
        • mainfalse
        • pool
        • smallfalse
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultnot-tested
        • depthUsd0.010983999999999999
      • #57 fields
        • mainfalse
        • pool
        • smallfalse
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultnot-tested
        • depthUsd0.0018909999999999999
      • #67 fields
        • mainfalse
        • pool
        • smalltrue
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultnot-tested
        • depthUsd0.000335
      • #77 fields
        • mainfalse
        • pool
        • smalltrue
        • token
        • venueuniswap-v4
        • resultcould-not-test
        • depthUsd0
    • adapterSell3 fields
      • coverage6 fields
        • completetrue
        • attempted1
        • materiality4 fields
          • mainPool
          • measuredtrue
          • smallPools2
          • mainDepthUsd0.06597499999999999
        • omittedKeysnone
        • omittedPools0
        • candidateCount1
      • routeSimulations1 item
        • #14 fields
          • reasonThis V4 pool holds no active liquidity and has no hook that could source any, so nothing can route through it: neither leg says anything about the token.
          • statusINCONCLUSIVE
          • evidence10 fields
            • pool
            • hooks
            • poolId
            • counter
            • feeTier100
            • routeId
            • hooklesstrue
            • protocoluniswap-v4
            • tradeabledead
            • activeLiquidity0
          • setAsidetrue
      • alternativeRoutesnone
    • tokenWideRule2 fields
      • firedfalse
      • failedii
    • buySellAsymmetry3 fields
      • buys24hnull
      • flaggedfalse
      • sells24hnull
    • otherVenuesCandidateCount7
  • Checks with missing data

    Warn

    We are publishing this verdict because a critical finding was read directly.

    Some checks could not be read on this scan, which would normally hold a verdict back. Missing data elsewhere cannot undo that finding.

    • deferredfalse
    • capAppliedtrue
    • custodyCapAppliedtrue
    • unavailableChecks10 items
      • #11 field
        • idlp_custody
      • #21 field
        • iddeployer_history
      • #31 field
        • idfunding_lineage
      • #41 field
        • idliquidity_depth
      • #51 field
        • idfdv_liquidity_ratio
      • #61 field
        • idvolume_turnover
      • #71 field
        • idwash_trading
      • #81 field
        • idtax_manipulation
      • #91 field
        • idpool_age
      • #101 field
        • idlaunchpad_provenance
  • Contract ownership

    Warn

    This contract still has an active owner: .

    • owner
    • renouncedfalse
    • contractAuditAuthorities1 item
      • #13 fields
        • kindownable
        • controller
        • materialityNoteGoverns all detected capabilities: ADDRESS_BLOCK, TRANSFER_GATE_LOCAL, UPGRADE_CODE.
    • contractAuditCapabilitiesADDRESS_BLOCKTRANSFER_GATE_LOCALUPGRADE_CODE
    • contractAuditCompletenesscomplete
    • contractAuditSourceVerifiedtrue
  • Upgradeable proxy

    Warn

    The code can be changed, but we found no admin address for it.

    That does not prove the power to change it is gone. Another upgrade route may still be live.

    • adminnull
    • proxytrue
    • beaconnull
    • implementation
    • contractAuditProxyGraph8 fields
      • kinduups
      • adminnull
      • depth0
      • beaconnull
      • facetsnull
      • completenesscomplete
      • implementation
      • truncationReasonnull

These are gaps in what we could see, not problems found in this token.

  • A contract created this token, so we can't see the person behind it.

    Not checked

    Applies to: Funder rug history, Deployer launch history, Funding lineage, Tax manipulation

    • Funder rug history

      So we can't check for past rugs, because many people launch through it. The transaction that created it was sent by , but a transaction sender can be the pad's own relayer rather than the launcher, so we don't attribute any history to that address.

      • deployer
      • skipKindunavailable
      • deployerKindCONTRACT
      • launchOrigin6 fields
        • viacreation-tx
        • whya transaction sender can be the pad's own relayer rather than the launcher
        • kindEOA
        • address
        • holdsTokenfalse
        • attributablefalse
      • sharedDeployertrue
      • deployerResolvedtrue
    • Deployer launch history

      So we can't check its past launches. The transaction that created it was sent by , but a transaction sender can be the pad's own relayer rather than the launcher, so we don't attribute any history to that address.

      • deployer
      • skipKindunavailable
      • deployerKindCONTRACT
      • launchOrigin6 fields
        • viacreation-tx
        • whya transaction sender can be the pad's own relayer rather than the launcher
        • kindEOA
        • address
        • holdsTokenfalse
        • attributablefalse
      • sharedDeployertrue
      • deployerResolvedtrue
    • Funding lineage

      So we can't trace who funded it. The transaction that created it was sent by , but a transaction sender can be the pad's own relayer rather than the launcher, so we don't attribute any history to that address.

      • deployer
      • skipKindunavailable
      • deployerKindCONTRACT
      • launchOrigin6 fields
        • viacreation-tx
        • whya transaction sender can be the pad's own relayer rather than the launcher
        • kindEOA
        • address
        • holdsTokenfalse
        • attributablefalse
      • sharedDeployertrue
      • deployerResolvedtrue
    • Tax manipulation

      So we can't check whether it changed fees or limits.

      • scopecontract-creator
  • LP custody

    Not checked

    We skipped this pool: it is one of 7 V4 pools for this token, outside the 6 with the most liquidity.

    We checked the pools that back the price instead. 3 other pools charge a fee too large to trade through, so nothing a holder owns is at risk there. This token trades in 7 pools. We couldn't measure their sizes, so the pool named here may not be its main market. The full pool list is in the evidence.

    • poolId
    • protocoluniswap-v4
    • coverageOkfalse
    • custodyStateUNKNOWN
    • demotedPools3 items
      • #14 fields
        • lpFee600000
        • poolId
        • reasonuntradeable-fee
        • statusFAIL
      • #24 fields
        • lpFee550000
        • poolId
        • reasonuntradeable-fee
        • statusFAIL
      • #34 fields
        • lpFee790000
        • poolId
        • reasonuntradeable-fee
        • statusFAIL
    • attributedPctnull
    • poolsAssessed8 items
      • #112 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee600000
        • poolId
        • reasonThe largest liquidity provider, 0x6fb98deadf2d83cecd9e9ce608c7983af23143bf (a smart-account wallet), controls 64.5% of this pool's liquidity and can withdraw it at any moment. It is not the deployer. Renouncing ownership does not protect against this. None of this V4 pool's liquidity is burned or locked.
        • statusFAIL
        • feeTier600000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
        • reconciledAgainststate-at-ceiling
        • reconciledAtBlock99115354
      • #212 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee550000
        • poolId
        • reasonThe largest liquidity provider, 0xc43a493e063365f31e54ce14d3ff2f1b7540d516 (a plain wallet), controls 100.0% of this pool's liquidity and can withdraw it at any moment. It is not the deployer. Renouncing ownership does not protect against this. None of this V4 pool's liquidity is burned or locked.
        • statusFAIL
        • feeTier550000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
        • reconciledAgainststate-at-ceiling
        • reconciledAtBlock99115354
      • #312 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee790000
        • poolId
        • reasonThe largest liquidity provider, 0xd0ba2d270f132764340cc688a759db6122fbce29 (a plain wallet), controls 100.0% of this pool's liquidity and can withdraw it at any moment. It is not the deployer. Renouncing ownership does not protect against this. None of this V4 pool's liquidity is burned or locked.
        • statusFAIL
        • feeTier790000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • custodyStateLP_CONCENTRATED
        • reconciledAgainststate-at-ceiling
        • reconciledAtBlock99115354
      • #410 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee701300
        • poolId
        • reasonWe couldn't read this pool's liquidity history, so we couldn't check who holds its liquidity.
        • statusSKIP
        • feeTier701300
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • custodyStateUNKNOWN
      • #510 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee750000
        • poolId
        • reasonWe couldn't read this pool's liquidity history, so we couldn't check who holds its liquidity.
        • statusSKIP
        • feeTier750000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • custodyStateUNKNOWN
      • #610 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • lpFee800000
        • poolId
        • reasonWe couldn't read this pool's liquidity history, so we couldn't check who holds its liquidity.
        • statusSKIP
        • feeTier800000
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • poolOrigin5 fields
          • viadirect
          • openedBy
          • thirdPartytrue
          • openedThrough
          • senderComparabletrue
        • custodyStateUNKNOWN
      • #78 fields
        • pool
        • dexIduniswap
        • poolId
        • reasonWe skipped this pool: it is one of 7 V4 pools for this token, outside the 6 with the most liquidity. We checked the pools that back the price instead.
        • statusSKIP
        • protocoluniswap-v4
        • custodyStateUNKNOWN
        • notScoredForCosttrue
      • #86 fields
        • poolnull
        • dexIduniswap
        • reasonThe deployer holds no V3 liquidity positions, so none of them are in this token's pool. This covers positions held through the V3 position manager only.
        • statusPASS
        • protocoluniswap-v3
        • custodyStateNOT_HELD
    • notScoredForCosttrue
    • v4DiscoveryCompletetrue
    • materialityUnmeasuredtrue
  • Liquidity depth

    Not checked

    We could not read this token's market data, so we did not measure its pool depth.

    That is a gap in what we could see, not a finding about the token.

    • FDV vs liquidity ratio

      Not checked

      We don't have the market data needed to compare this token's value at full supply with its liquidity.

      • Volume turnover

        Not checked

        We don't have the volume and liquidity figures needed to check turnover.

        • Wash trading

          Not checked

          We don't have the market data needed to check for wash trading.

          • Pool age

            Not checked

            We could not find when this token's pool was created.

            • Launchpad provenance

              Not checked

              A contract deployed this token, but that contract is not in the launchpad registry.

              So we can't tell where it launched.

              • deployer
              • registryHitfalse
              • deployerKindCONTRACT
              • launchInsiderBuy11 fields
                • ethIn0
                • pools
                • statusno-insider-buy
                • txHash
                • creatornull
                • factorynull
                • fundedBy
                • tokensOut0
                • recipientsnone
                • supplyBoughtPct0
                • singleSidedSeedsnone
            • Impersonation

              Pass

              This token does not share its name and symbol with any real tokenized share.

              • checkedAgainst197
            • Explorer scam flag

              Pass

              The explorer has not tagged this contract as a scam.

              • is_scamfalse
              • public_tagsnone
            • Confirmed rug

              Pass

              This token is not on our list of confirmed rugs.

              • tokenRugReadtrue
            • Prior honeypot mark

              Pass

              This token has no honeypot mark in our records.

              • marksReadtrue
            • Prior pump-and-dump mark

              Pass

              This token has no pump-and-dump mark in our records.

              • marksReadtrue
            • Holder concentration

              Pass

              Top 10 holders hold 5% of the tokens in circulation.

              Against total supply, the top 10 hold 0.3%. Liquidity pools hold 94.4% of total supply, and we leave them out of the tokens in circulation. The top 10 share also moves when pool liquidity moves, even if no holder trades.

              • basiscirculating float (total supply − liquidity pools − burn)
              • top1010 items
                • #13 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value553210709041549338606200
                  • address
                • #23 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value352262081486948459852048
                  • address
                • #33 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value334139298792052476390555
                  • address
                • #43 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value322478207080135895516660
                  • address
                • #53 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value225634380470730282891373
                  • address
                • #63 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value215725478307591029344655
                  • address
                • #73 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value205841124084590891879530
                  • address
                • #83 fields
                  • classWALLET_7702
                  • value191500732960478009492496
                  • address
                • #93 fields
                  • classEOA
                  • value180826407063319057963102
                  • address
                • #103 fields
                  • classEOA
                  • value163131722454824482999326
                  • address
              • excludedpoolsregistered custody / DEX infrastructurelaunchpad curve escrowpermanent supply lockersdead addresses
              • top10Pct4.9
              • holderCount50
              • totalSupply1000000000000000000000000000
              • holderListReadtrue
              • top10PctMerged4.9
              • excludedBalance944029647397933836163694049
              • poolSetCompletetrue
              • wallet7702Count8
              • circulatingFloat55970352602066163836305951
              • holderClassBasiseth_getCode per holder: EOA / WALLET_7702 (EIP-7702 delegation designator, a user wallet) / CONTRACT / UNREADABLE (getCode faulted). All classes count toward the share; the prose names each holder by its own class.
              • escrowLookThroughnull
              • excludedPoolCount10
              • pooledPctOfSupply94.4
              • curveEscrowAddressnull
              • curveEscrowExcluded0
              • lockedSupplyExcluded0
              • top10PctOfTotalSupply0.27
              • curveEscrowPctOfSupply0
              • poolAndBurnPctOfSupply94.4
              • lockedSupplyPctOfSupply0
              • top10PctBeforeLookThrough4.9
              • balancesExceedReportedSupplyfalse
            • Source verification

              Pass

              This contract's source is verified on the explorer, but it was matched from another address with identical bytecode, not proven against this one.

              This is about its implementation at .

              • answeredBy2 fields
                • sourceIdblockscout
                • servedFromfresh
              • is_verifiedtrue
              • verified_at
              • via_bytecode_dbtrue
              • is_fully_verifiedtrue
              • is_partially_verifiedfalse
            • Paid promotion

              Pass

              No paid promotion found on DexScreener.

              • paidOrdersnone
              • activeBoosts0
              • approvedOrderTypesnone
              • heavyCampaignThreshold50
            • Contract age

              Pass

              This contract was 3 days old at this scan.

              • ageHours63.7
              • creationTx
              • deployedAt2026-10-24T17:07:19.000000Z
            • Bytecode fingerprint

              Pass

              The source is verified, so anyone can read the code.

              We could not match it to a known template.

              • fingerprintUNKNOWN
              • bytecodeLength181
            Holders
            Top 1 · 1.0%Next 9 · 3.9%Rest · 95.1%
            • Largest wallet1.0%
              0x632a…0eac
            • #2 wallet0.6%
              0x6ae6…540c
            Key addresses
            • LARGEST HOLDER
              0x632a…0eac
            • ACTIVE OWNER KEY
              0x2d89…cE29
            Nº 1249 · CRITICAL · formula v1.63 · Oct 27, 2026Verify on the ledger · Report a mistake
            Evaluated under method 1.63. The current method is 2.0.1. See what changed
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            Verdict receipt #1249
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